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Reason-cold, calculating, unimpassioned reason-
must furnish all the materials for our future
support and defence. Let those materials be moulded into
general intelligence, sound morality, and in particular,
a reverence for the Constitution and laws ....
and as truly as has been said of the only greater institution,
the gates of hell shall not prevail against it.'
I. LEGALISM AND THE AMERICAN QUEST FOR POLITICAL LEGITIMACY
Far more than elites in most political communities, political and
intellectual leaders of the United States have always faced special
challenges in legitimating the American regime. From the nation's start,
America's governors have presented their political community as self-
consciously created by modem human beings. They could not simply claim
that fidelity to the citizenry's ancestors required loyalty to the United
States, because the nation was born in rebellion against claims of
unqualified ancestral obligations. They also could not inspire devotion to
the regime by presenting it as simply natural or handed down through
history from time out of mind. The American revolutionaries overtly
repudiated their historical political identities and explicitly created new
ones (though some claimed to take guidance from natural law). All just
governments, they insisted, derive their powers from the consent of the
t Alfred Cowles Professor of Government, Yale University.
1. Abraham Lincoln, Address Before the Young Men's Lyceum of Springfield, Illinois (Jan.
27, 1837), in I THE WRITINGS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 148, 160 (Arthur Brooks Lapsley ed.,
1923) [hereinafter WRITINGS]. Later editors of Lincoln's works correctly date this speech as
January 27, 1838. See, e.g., ABRAHAM LINCOLN: SELECTED SPEECHES, MESSAGES, AND
LETrERS 5 (T. Harry Williams ed., 1957).
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governed. But to what then could they appeal to inspire consent, especially
to those not inclined to give it?2
As a twenty-nine year old lawyer in his second year of practice,
Abraham Lincoln spoke the words quoted above in a speech to other
ambitious young men. In that speech, he adopted one answer to the problem
of legitimating the American regime that has long been a favorite of
American lawyers. Lincoln believed that "the strongest bulwark of any
government" was in fact popular consent, or as he put it, "the attachment
of the people" 3 to their regime. Yet he feared that by overly emphasizing
consent, the majority of the moment would work its unbridled will, thereby
spreading a "mobocratic spirit" that would destroy popular attachment to
the regime over time.4 Therefore, Lincoln suggested maintaining loyalty to
America by fostering not simply belief in popular sovereignty, not just
devotion to country, but a more particular reverence for the Constitution
and the rule of law. Refusal to "violate in the least particular, the laws of
the country" should become "the political religion of the nation."'
Devotion to the Constitution and to the rule of law would generate the
enduring consent that the American regime needed to sustain it. Thus, the
regime might realize its potential for "the advancement of the noblest of
causes-that of establishing and maintaining civil and religious liberty.",
6
There is much to commend the young Mr. Lincoln for stressing popular
belief in American constitutionalism and legalism more generally as
sources of political legitimacy, stability, and progress in America. A nation
that has decided to forgo an established religion and embrace as citizens
people of highly diverse origins probably needs a unifying centerpiece that
expresses what binds the community. Many find it hard to see how
anything other than the Constitution can play that role in the United States.7
It is also hard to see how any regime can sustain popular support or seem
intrinsically legitimate if governors and citizens alike behave in arbitrary
and capricious ways because they have neither honored nor achieved the
rule of law.
Yet it is striking that Lincoln went on to become a President who
disdained too much preoccupation with "forms of law."' He openly
contended that violating certain "particulars" of the Constitution might be
justified, asking "are all the laws but one to go unexecuted, and the
2. For an overview of the political and ideological challenges America's nation-builders
faced, see ROGERS M. SMITH, Civic IDEALS: CONFLICTING VISIONS OF CITIZENSHIP IN U.S.
HISTORY 70-86 (1997).
3. Lincoln, supra note 1, at 153.
4. Id
5. Id, at 154.
6. ld. at 159.
7. See SANFORD LEVINSON, CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH (1988).
8. DAvID HERBERT DONALD, LINCOLN 485 (1995).
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government itself go to pieces lest that one be violated?" 9 He arguably went
on to violate the Constitution more than any other President before or
since.1" Lincoln's example suggests that although instilling reverence for
the Constitution and the law may be a part of the political answer to
generating stable support for the American regime, it cannot be the whole
answer to the problem of legitimating the regime. Indeed, his wartime
actions imply that such reverence may sometimes inhibit efforts needed to
maintain the nation and to strengthen its legitimacy. If so, then young Mr.
Lincoln was not literally right when he argued that cold, unimpassioned
reason supported unqualified reverence for the law. Instead, too much
reverence might hinder recognition of what reason truly reveals to be
needed for the regime to be perceived as, and to be, legitimate.
This Essay considers how far achieving governmental legitimacy can
be equated with maintaining the rule of law or popular sovereignty by
assessing the treatment of Lincoln, Reconstruction, and the American
regime in Bruce Ackerman's two We the People volumes. These volumes
have been roughly two decades in the making. Ackerman was also a
remarkably talented young lawyer of relatively humble origins when he
conceived the basic arguments of his impressive work. Like Lincoln,
Ackerman wants to bolster the legitimacy of the American regime
(particularly its courts and lawyers) by showing that the United States has
always fundamentally adhered to both the rule of law and government by
consent. Ackerman's theory magnificently unearths and examines crucial
problems with strictly legalistic defenses for the legitimacy of the American
government. In doing so, he genuinely illuminates major historical episodes
in American political development, including the great debates of
Reconstruction, in ways other writers (including myself) have neglected or
obscured. Because Ackerman arguably has best and most fully defined the
American political system and defended its legitimacy in legalistic terms,
examining his work significantly helps in reflecting on the strengths and
limits of American constitutionalism and the rule of law.
But upon such reflection, Ackerman's perspective proves limited. Like
much law-centered scholarship and normative theory, his work excessively
9. Abraham Lincoln, Message to Congress in Special Session (July 4, 1861), in 5 WRITINGS,
supra note 1, at 327. Lincoln's apparent disregard for many constitutional restrictions was
intensely controversial during his presidency. See, e.g., DONALD, supra note 8, at 303-04, 382-83,
419-21, 441-43, 484-85, 489. The most influential scholarly case against the constitutionality of
Lincoln's conduct during the Civil War was made by J.G. RANDALL, CONSTITUTIONAL
PROBLEMS UNDER LINCOLN (rev. ed. 1951). The debate continues today. See, e.g., HAROLD M.
HYM1AN & WILLAM M. WIEcEK, EQUAL JUsTIcE UNDER LAW: CONsTITUTIONAL
DEVELOPMENT, 1835-1875, at 232-78 (1982); MARK E. NEELY, JR., THE FATE OF LIBERTY:
ABRAHAM LINCOLN AND CIVIL LIBERTIES (1991).
10. To be sure, Lincoln always insisted that he did not believe "any law was violated" by his
controversial acts, such as his suspension of habeas corpus. Abraham Lincoln, Message to
Congress in Special Session (July 4, 1861), in 5 WRITINGs, supra note 1, at 327.
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focuses on legalistic legitimacy linked to government by consent. Even on
his own terms, Ackerman more successfully proves that the United States
has recurrently won legitimacy through popular consent than he proves his
most prominent and distinctive contention: that the United States has
fundamentally adhered to the rule of law. As he strives to fit various
historical events into his theory of popularly approved legalistic legitimacy,
Ackerman must minimize or marginalize arguments that were central to the
actors at the time. The Republicans had distinctive constitutional reasons
for privileging Congress in the American system and substantive reasons
for challenging the Jacksonian Democratic vision of the nation in the first
place. By minimizing these and other substantive claims in favor of
legalistic process arguments, Ackerman slights the moral principles of the
architects of Reconstruction and minimizes the moral costs of its demise.
In the end, Ackerman's legalism leads him to underemphasize what the
nation's experience during the Civil War and Reconstruction teaches about
the problem of political legitimacy. Although the rule of law and popular
consent can and should serve as bulwarks that buttress loyalty to a regime,
legitimacy must ultimately rest on whether the basic principles and
practices of the regime are substantively good. If they are good, and if most
people understand them to be good, then violations of the rule of law and
popular consent will not matter so much insofar as they help establish those
principles and practices. This lesson for political legitimacy is one that the
young Lincoln's reasoning quietly implied and the older Lincoln's actions
more loudly endorsed.
Most people accept the legitimacy of the Thirteenth and Fourteenth
Amendments not because they think the amendments were enacted through
legalistically appropriate "higher lawmaking" processes, nor even because
the amendments had popular approval. Most of us-including, sometimes,
Professor Ackerman-accept them because we believe that in substance
they did what was good and right. They further established and extended
liberty, the noblest cause government can serve. Ackerman's desire to
minimize judgments of legitimacy that look to substance rather than process
is both understandable and characteristic of much legal, political, and
historical scholarship. Nevertheless, it leads to exaggerated efforts to shore
up the legalistic validity of America's political history while obscuring the
substantive issues on which legitimacy must ultimately turn.
In Part II, I document how Ackerman's approach is powerfully
motivated by his desire to defend the American regime on essentially
procedural rule of law grounds. In Part I, I review major insights that
approach produces. Part IV lays out various historical distortions, minor
and major, that the framework generates. Finally, Part V concludes that the
most important elements of governmental legitimacy cannot be captured
within the limits of legalistic legitimation.
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I1. ACKERMAN'S PATRIOTIC LEGALISM
It may seem strange to equate Ackerman's approach with one espoused
in a patriotic public speech by an aspiring young politician. Professor
Ackerman is, after all, a cosmopolitan and highly sophisticated scholar, not
an ill-educated frontier office-seeker currying local favor. Still, Ackerman
hopes that his book "partially repays my enormous debt to the institutions,
and the country, that made it possible."" u Hs work is born of a profound
wish to serve the United States and its political institutions. That aspiration
is not so different from that of Lincoln, who sought in his 1838 speech to
identify what would most contribute to "the perpetuation of our political
institutions."' 2 Though commendable, this aspiration requires us to
approach Ackerman's analysis with certain suspicions. Ackerman does not
promise the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth. Instead, he
offers an analysis that will, if accepted, help the United States and its
particular institutions." Although patriotism and the whole truth may
sometimes be identical twins, more often they are not. We must be wary
about whether the argument will fully acknowledge realities that might cast
an irredeemably negative light on America and its institutions.
Ackerman wants to serve his country by reinvigorating the nation's
political ideals and institutions. He fears they are now inadequately
understood and appreciated. The "distinctive aspirations of the American
republic" are in danger of becoming "lost in the fog of ancient history." 14
That danger matters, because Ackerman believes it is in fact "our
constitutional narrative" that "constitutes us as a people."' " He also
believes that "America is a legalistic country" and that partisans who can
present themselves as "guardians of legality" have enormous political
advantages. 6 If the wrong narrative or narratives dominate, then Americans
will not be who they really should be, and the wrong partisan causes may
prevail.'
7
11. 2 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS at x (1998).
12. Lincoln, supra note 1, at 148.
13. Ackerman does say that he was determined to tell the "painful" truth that Reagan had led
a successful conservative constitutional transformation in the 1980s, if events had warranted it.
Doubtless he was; but this determination only expresses his desire to uphold his patriotic claim
that the value of American constitutionalism is so great that it overrides partisan reversals. And as
matters turned out, he believes he was able to reject that unpalatable conclusion after all. See 2
ACKERMAN, supra note II, at 420.
14. 1 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 57 (1991).
15. 1 id. at 36. Whether it is empirically true that the American people are constituted by their
"constitutional narrative" is an important issue I do not examine here, though I think it merits
more skeptical scrutiny than many legal scholars give it.
16. 2 ACKERAN, supra note 11, at 12-13.
17. See 2 id. Like Ackerman on these pages, I here take "legalistic" legitimacy to mean
legitimacy resting on conformity to authoritatively "established principles and procedures" for
governmental action.
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More specifically, Ackerman contends that the common stories about
our political institutions harm the nation in several ways. In his first
volume, he stresses that the various narratives he seeks to displace tend to
distort and discredit the interpretive role of the Supreme Court, fostering
"corrosive skepticism" about the legitimacy of many of its decisions, about
the Court as an institution, about the lawyers who benefit from the
judiciary's power, and about the rule of law in America more generally.
Ackerman there hopes to show instead that the Court has almost always
made "good-faith" efforts at constitutional interpretation and has done "a
pretty good job" in that endeavor. In so doing, he seeks to assist the Court's
work and also to restore faith in both the bench and the bar. He is clearly
particularly concerned about generating confidence in the allegedly
untethered reformist decisions that liberal judges and lawyers produced
during the post-1937 New Deal and Warren Court eras. His most dramatic
claim in that volume is that the post-1937 Supreme Court opinions
completed an informal but legally legitimate process of constitutional
amendment. He also, however, seeks to foster faith generally in the
American constitutional system as "a rule of law." 8 In his -second volume,
this last goal is even more central. Ackerman there concentrates on
defending his "larger understanding of the law of higher lawmaking," one
that shows why we can see not just the New Deal developments, but all our
major constitutional transformations that appear to violate textual legal
requirements for change and thus to be lawlessness, as nonetheless in
conformity with the rule of law."
Both volumes defend key aspects of the American constitutional system
in order to vindicate their broader claim to legalistic legitimacy. Both rely,
however, on Ackerman's dualist account of American constitutionalism.
This account bases the authority of constitutional texts or quasi-texts on
their origins in particularly engaged, deliberative, and sustained processes
of democratic decisionmaking on fundamental questions. Hence Ackerman
argues not only for the legality of American institutions but for their
grounding in popular sovereignty. For him, valid law must be grounded in
some sort of popular consent. He thinks that prevailing constitutional
narratives not only undermine the legitimacy of the United States as a rule
of law regime but also obscure this popular consensual character of
American government. Thus, they tend to "loosen the popular grasp on the
democratic ideals animating our constitutional life," weakening the
18. 1 ACKERMAN, supra note 14, at 131-62.
19. 2 ACKERMAN, supra note 11, at 72; see also 2 id. at 14,70, 342-44.
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regime's democratic legitimacy and increasing the vulnerability of its ideals
to future crises.2"
To ward off these dangers, Ackerman wants to persuade us that
Americans can view their system, rightly understood, as legitimate chiefly
according to the two linked standards of legality and popular sovereignty.
In these volumes (as in his earlier political theory2l), he prefers to stress
these criteria for legitimacy more than the question of whether the
American constitutional system, or any system of government, is
substantively good. Identifying himself as a reformer, not a simple defender
of the status quo, Ackerman argues that his conception of American
constitutionalism simply aids reflection on how good this system of
government actually is.
Yet we should not be misled. Though reluctant to rest his case on
claims of what is ultimately good, Ackerman also hopes to convince us that
American constitutionalism, if recognized as the system of dualist
democracy he defines, is the best system of government, at least for the
American people. Somewhat ironically, it is so good in part because it is
justified primarily in terms of legality and popular consent, not substantive
goodness. With much wisdom, Ackerman believes that when political
leaders feel they can disregard legalism and concern themselves only with
the substance of their policies, they threaten to careen out of democratic
control and become despotic. Hence there is danger in putting issues of
substance center-stage in discussions of legitimacy.22
Even so, the last chapter of his first volume-entitled "Why
Dualism?"---defends the merits of the American system against various
objections and alternatives, especially stressing how the system provides
means for democratically and legalistically valid improvements. Ackerman
acknowledges there that his case represents an effort by a "Yale law
professor to see the bright side of the American constitutional achievement
and to call his fellow Americans to live out its dream,"' but he suggests
that this bright side is the right side to see. His second volume reaffirms that
normative message, holding that dualistic government "is especially
appropriate for a citizenry whose engagement with politics varies
substantially from decade to decade," 24 as is true of the American citizenry
(and surely all citizenries). Even when disappointed by the shortcomings of
20. 1 ACKERMAN, supra note 14, at 4; see also 2 ACKERMAN, supra note 11, at 3-15, 30,
344,418-20.
21. See BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUsTICE IN THE LIBERAL STATE 9-10, 17-24 (1980)
(eschewing legitimation in terms of a theory of the good in favor of legitimation in terms of
agreements reached via constrained dialogue, a form of consensual justification).
22. See 1 ACKERMAN, supra note 14, at 7, 319-22; 2 ACKERMAN, supra note 11, at 12, 175-
76,406-12,419-20.
23. 1 ACKERMAN, supra note 14, at 314.
24. 2 ACKERMAN, supra note 11, at 6.
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Reconstruction, Ackerman insists that the reactionary opposition of Andrew
Johnson actually had its virtues, and that it would have been worse to have
more sweeping changes imposed by vanguardism. Similarly, he presents his
own reform proposals in both volumes as efforts to continue and to perfect
American dualist democracy, at most as revolutionary reforms, not as
efforts to transform or transcend the system in any totalistic way.'
All of Ackerman's arguments amount to a rather staggering claim.
America's constitutional system, rightly understood, turns out to be
fundamentally legitimate according to the criteria of rule of law, popular
consent, and intrinsic goodness, all at once. One might reasonably fear that
conformity to law would at times have been in irresolvable tension with
conforming to popular will and/or with achieving an intrinsically good
system. Not so. Ackerman is a lucky man in a lucky country, it seems. If he
can persuade us that this is genuinely so, he will have gone far toward
inspiring reverence for American laws, repaying his country richly indeed.
Still, we must look before making such leaps of faith. Lawyers, after
all, always try to convince us that what the law authorizes and what is good
from their client's point of view are identical. When, as in the case of
faithful judges as well as patriotic lawyer-scholars, their client is the U.S.
political system itself, the psychological and political imperatives to
persuade everyone, including themselves, that what is good and what is
legal and what is popularly approved are really all basically the same
become even greater. Who in such ranks would wish to convey a doleful
message holding that American constitutionalism has been in part
ineradicably evil, or that its most substantively estimable provisions were
not legally enacted, or that they do not actually represent government by
popular consent? Ackerman acknowledges that he is highly unwilling to
reach such conclusions. He convincingly describes the Reconstruction
amendments as "the greatest statements of moral principle ever pronounced
in the name of the American people," and he indicates he would go to great
lengths to avoid discrediting them. He even says that if their validity could
be sustained only through "obscurantism," such a "noble lie" might be
acceptable.26 He seeks to show that no lie is necessary to defend the
amendments' legality, but he concedes that they represent the sort of
"unconventional adaptation" that "bends accepted legalisms to the
breaking point."'27 Though Ackerman insists this point has never been
reached, that such breakage "is not (quite) what happens" in American
constitutional development, does he strain too much to tie upon
25. See, e.g., I ACKERMAN, supra note 14, at 295-322; 2 ACKERMAN, supra note 11, at 6-7,
12, 158-59, 172, 175-76, 182, 407-20.
26. 2 ACKERMAN, supra note 11, at 100.
27. 2 id. at 384.
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Reconstruction the bow of legal legitimacy that he so passionately wants us
all to see?
28
IT[. THE CONTRIBUTIONS OF ACKERMAN'S LEGALISM
Before turning to criticism, however, let us briefly recapitulate
Ackerman's case for the legality of the Reconstruction amendments and
take note of some substantial benefits that flow from adopting his
perspective. Before offering his defense of America's historical compliance
with the rule of law, Ackerman brings out a number of impressively
daunting obstacles to that defense. He also shows that important historical
actors worried and argued extensively over the apparent violations of
legality Ackerman highlights. Many advocates of the Constitution knew
they were vulnerable to charges that their ratification procedures seemed to
violate the Articles of Confederation explicitly, and their opponents
advanced those charges. Similarly, proponents of the Reconstruction
amendments knew that their processes of proposing and ratifying their new
constitutional articles could be accused of being insufficiently
representative and unduly coercive, as their critics contended. Many
changes during the New Deal era-including national power over the
economy, the distribution of powers between the federal government and
the states, and eventually treaty-making procedures-faced plausible
accusations of unconstitutionality that were not clearly resolved by any
amendments at all. Many of these vital problems of apparent fundamental
illegality have been unconvincingly dismissed or ignored by other scholars.
Ackerman is right to insist that they demand our attention.29
Ackerman's own response is simple in concept but complex in
elaboration and application. The Constitution's Framers, he accepts, did act
in ways that were illegal when they created that document. The legitimacy
of their deeds rested on the consent they managed to obtain from standing
institutions and ultimately from the people themselves." But in so doing,
Ackerman contends, the Founders pioneered structures of higher
lawmaking, functionally designed to elicit deliberative popular approval,
28. See 2 id. One can ask the same questions about how he treats the Founding and the New
Deal. Efforts to claim legitimacy according to several standards at once often contort legal
reasoning generally and constitutional reasoning in particular. See Rogers M. Smith, The Inherent
Deceptiveness of Constitutional Discourse: A Diagnosis and Prescription, in NOMOS XL:
INTEGRITY AND CONSCIENcE 218, 219, 223 (Ian Shapiro & Robert Adams eds., 1998).
29. See 1 ACKERIAN, supra note 14, at 41-44; 2 ACKERMAN, supra note 11, at 8-12, 34-39,
100-19, 258-61; Bruce Ackerman & David Golove, Is NAFTA Constitutional?, 108 HARv. L.
REV. 801, 802, 845-51 (1995). The last essay is particularly compelling evidence of how
Ackerman's framework helps highlight and illuminate important but neglected issues, in this case
changing treaty ratification processes.
30. See 2 ACKERMAN, supra note 11, at 39-65.
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that could thereafter serve as a "Founding Precedent" for legally valid
procedures for changing the Constitution that would not conform to Article
V.31 He insists that lawyers using common law methods can discern the
bases for the legitimacy of the seemingly illegal constitutional
transformations during Reconstruction and the New Deal. For centuries,
lawyers have discerned legally authoritative patterns and analogies in past
cases and practices. They have not just read statutes. Such common law
methods, Ackerman claims, can help us first identify successful
"constitutional moments" from the constitutional talk that goes on in even
in intervening periods of normal politics, and second, show why these
moments are legitimate as products of the law of higher lawmaking and not
only as expressions of elite or popular will.3"
Ackerman finds that in American history each major period of "higher
lawmaking," when "normal politics" of interest bargaining gave way to
focused attention on great constitutional issues, works through four stages:
(1) "signaling," when a political movement advocating important
constitutional changes has won sufficient support to be able to claim to set
the national agenda; (2) "proposal," when the movement is politically
compelled to offer operational specifics for the general changes it
advocates; (3) "mobilized popular deliberation," when institutional
opposition arises and so popular support for the proposed specifics is tested
repeatedly; and (4) "legal codification," when a successful movement is
recognized by various official actors including finally the courts, who
pervasively synthesize these approved changes with prevailing doctrines
throughout the law.
But matters are more complex yet. The third stage, "mobilized popular
deliberation," must itself be broken down into five stages: 33 (1) a
constitutional impasse when different governmental actors disagree over the
new operational proposals; (2) a decisive election producing an initial
popular mandate for the specific changes; (3) an attack by the freshly
bolstered reformers on those segments of government that still resist their
innovations; (4) a "switch in time," when the more conservative
governmental segments partly or wholly capitulate and endorse the
changes;34 and (5) a "consolidating election" when the people confirm that
they are indeed happy with all that has occurred. Only then does it fall to
the courts and others to engage in legal consolidation.36
31. 2id. at66-70.
32. See 1 ACKERMAN, supra note 14, at 269-72; 2 ACKERMAN, supra note 11, at 4-5, 11, 14,
28, 70, 91-95, 116, 232, 246.
33. 1 ACKERMAN, supra note 14, at 266.
34. 2 ACKERMAN, supra note 11, at 20.
35. 2 id. at 25.
36. See I ACKERMAN, supra note 14, at 267.
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Finally, Ackerman urges us to remember that although every major
constitutional transformation thus far can be mapped onto this involved
(actually eight-stage) process, each successive transformative constitutional
movement has also transformed the specifics through which it fulfilled
these generalized stages. The particular institutional actors who have
signaled and proposed changes, offered resistance, and provided popular
mandates have all varied over time: constitutional conventions, Presidents,
Congress, the courts, state ratifying conventions, state legislatures,
presidential elections, and off-year congressional elections have all played
significant and shifting roles, sometimes signaling and proposing,
sometimes resisting or ratifying, sometimes helping to consolidate, in
different periods.37 And future constitutional movements can and probably
should seek to fulfill the multi-stage process in yet other new and different
ways.
38
This is a breathtakingly complex system that, when put to work, yields
a rich trove of historical insights. Yet, when applied to particular periods
such as Reconstruction, the system immediately becomes even more
complicated.39 Ackerman sees Lincoln's election in 1860 as a "signaling"
event indicating that major constitutional issues were now center stage, and
he sees Lincoln as later creating a novel presidential-leadership model of
constitutional change that produced the Thirteenth Amendment. But even
before it was ratified, Lincoln was shot, and Andrew Johnson pushed for
the amendment but then tried to lead change in a different direction. Next,
the Republican-dominated Congress initiated still another new version of
higher lawmaking, this time congressionally-led, which eventually
produced the Fourteenth and the (less procedurally problematic) Fifteenth
Amendment. Thus, by Ackerman's lights the Civil War/Reconstruction era
exhibited not one but two variations of the higher lawmaking process, the
second one building on but in major ways departing from the first. (Or
perhaps there were two and a half processes, depending on how one
classifies Johnson's activities.)'
Does this elaborate framework capture what happened? It certainly
spotlights some tremendously important things that did happen. His
lawyerly focus on processes of constitutional amendment first prompts
Ackerman to produce his marvelous summary of the dilemmas for legal
formalism posed by the Reconstruction Amendments: Assemblies held in
states excluded from representation in Congress, as well as structured and
pressured by Andrew Johnson, ratified the Thirteenth Amendment; that
37. See ACKERMAN, supra note 11, at 279-358.
38. See 2 id at 406-16.
39. The New Deal story has even more stages than Reconstruction. For a schematic
summary, see 2 id. at 359.
40. See 2 id. at 122-26.
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same "rump" Congress then proposed the Fourteenth Amendment; then
Congress made ratification by the Southern states a rather coercive
condition for their regaining congressional representation.4
More importantly, this emphasis enables Ackerman to bring out
compellingly the ways this era actually centered on constitutional conflicts.
Throughout these years, elites and voters alike saw great constitutional
issues at stake and debated them with unusual intensity. They also argued
extensively over whether the constitution-making processes being pursued
were legal. Ackerman is right to suggest that leaders in both North and
South perceived Lincoln's election in 1860 on a platform opposed to
extending slavery as signaling, first and foremost, a threat to the dominance
of constitutional views that deliberately protected slavery.42 Indeed, the next
step taken by many leaders, and endorsed by Lincoln, was explicitly to
propose constitutional changes, partly reassuring the South by promising
non-interference with slavery where it stood, though partly confirming
Southern fears by refusing to support its extension.43 Similarly, it is also
plausible to see the Emancipation Proclamation as providing a more
specific proposal for the direction constitutional change should take, to
interpret Lincoln's insistence on an 1864 platform calling for a
constitutional amendment banning slavery as a continuation of this
mounting constitutional dialogue, and to contend that the Republicans'
1864 electoral victories persuaded many War Democrats to switch to
support for the amendment.'4 Ackerman convincingly notes that Lincoln
was then anxious over whether a ratification process that excluded the
Southern states would seem legitimate.45 Moreover, he forcefully argues
that Andrew Johnson, with a much less reformist agenda, used an
"unconventional" but "strategic mix of legal and extralegal elements" to
41. 2 id. at 102-16.
42. See 2 id. at 126-27. Ackerman aptly quotes Senator Ben Wade's insistence that the
election was waged on "the plainest and most palpable issue that ever was presented to the
American people, and one that they understood the best," the issue of extending slavery, 2 id. at
128, though Wade failed to give weight to the fact that 61% of the electorate voted for candidates
who supported the extension of slavery in one way or another. SMrrH, supra note 2, at 271.
43. See Abraham Lincoln, First Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1861), in 5 WRITNGS, supra
note 1, at 253-66. In this speech, Lincoln insisted that the issue of whether slavery "is wrong, and
ought not to be extended" is "the only substantial dispute" between the nation's two sections. l
at 262-63. He said that because he always believed the Constitution does not give the federal
government the power to interfere with slavery in states where it already exists, he was willing to
support a constitutional amendment stating so explicitly. Id. at 264-65. He also indicated that he
preferred for amendments "to originate with the people themselves," id. at 264, exemplifying the
kind of attention to constitution-making processes that Ackerman persuasively presents as
characteristic of this era.
44. Cf. DONALD, supra note 8, at 553-54 (discussing Lincoln's efforts to obtain Democrat
support for the Thirteenth Amendment after the 1864 election).
45. See 2 ACKERMAN, supra note 11, at 136-37.
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craft a ratification process that included mildly, but not too extensively,
coerced Southern states.46
Though I will suggest problems in Ackerman's version of
developments from 1860 to 1865, and though I think he goes further astray
in his treatment of congressionally-led Reconstruction from 1866 on, he is
certainly right that the Thirty-Ninth Congress saw itself as possessing a
popular mandate to seize the leadership of a process of constitutional
reformation that most in the Congress felt President Andrew Johnson was
betraying.47 Moreover, he corredtly stresses that the vulnerability of the
congressional reformers to the charge that they were not amending the
Constitution through appropriate Article V processes was a key and much
exploited asset of Andrew Johnson and his allies and a worry of "the first
importance" to many who supported reform.48 The election of 1866 did
provide strong and needed popular support for the congressional
Republicans' effort to answer liberally the "truly constitutive question" of
whether the U.S. citizenry should be formed on a racially inclusive rather
than all-white basis.49 The subsequent First and Second Reconstruction Acts
should be seen as elements in the Republicans' attempt to create a national
structure that would legitimately ratify their new constitutional vision."0 As
Ackerman continues with the separation-of-powers struggles among
Congress, the President, and the Supreme Court that culminated in both
presidential impeachment and judicial jurisdiction-stripping, through the
Fourteenth Amendment's ratification and the "consolidating election" of
1868, he repeatedly sustains his claim that these events cannot be grasped
adequately without recognizing them as part of an ongoing process of self-
conscious constitutional reform.5' By recovering these central dimensions
of Reconstruction, Ackerman has done a real service to historians, political
scientists, lawyers, and his country.
IV. DISTORTIONS OF PATRIOTIC LEGALISM
Nonetheless, the truth has only been partly served. Even on its face,
Ackerman's account of Reconstruction does not really vindicate the claim
that the United States has made major changes since its illegal founding
while substantially conforming to the rule of law, rather than adhering to
the sort of reliance on popular sovereignty that many far-from-legally
correct regimes can and do claim. Furthermore, his discussion somewhat
46. 2 id. at 138.
47. See 2 id. at 166-73.
48. 2 id. at 102.
49. 2 id. at 181-82.
50. See 2 id. at 190, 202.
51. 2 id. at 211.
1999] ,2051
The Yale Law Journal
distorts the self-presentation of Lincoln and many congressional
Republicans about their respective roles in processes of constitutional
transformation. It is thus not clear how the people who supported those
leaders can be said to have authorized the novel constitutional views and
processes Ackerman describes, rather than the views and processes the
leaders themselves described to their constituents. Finally, Ackerman's
account also diverts attention from the substantive constitutional questions
at stake in ways that miss much of what is most morally compelling in the
events he narrates. This minimization of substance has more than rhetorical
consequences. It leads Ackerman to seriously understate the severe damage
that Jacksonian Democrats (and their last champion, Stephen Douglas),
Andrew Johnson, and the Supreme Court (during what he calls the
"consolidation" phase of Reconstruction, a period better labeled as
Reconstruction's demolition) inflicted upon the moral legitimacy of the
system. Correspondingly, Ackerman's legalistic focus makes him fail to
give due expression and weight to what is in fact the greatest source of the
legitimacy of the Reconstruction amendments, their monumental moral
content.
A. Rule of Law or Popular Sovereignty?
Though Ackerman repeatedly tries to make American processes of
constitutional transformation look as legally legitimate as possible, he in
fact essentially concedes that these claims are unconvincing. In his more
optimistic statements, he stresses that there is a plausible "sense in which
the American Constitution remains continuous despite periods of
unconventional activity." " As I have noted, he argues that this sense is best
captured by analyzing American history using common law methods that
examine not only the formal rules and principles but also the deeper or
deepest structures of the law of higher lawmaking at work in different eras.
We can then discern so many analogies, recurring patterns, and deeper
regularities53 in the operation of those otherwise often unconventional
structures that we reach a heartening conclusion. Since the Founding,
American history has exhibited an ongoing tradition of higher lawmaking
without any radical breaks into lawless force.54 We are thus entitled to
affirm all such unconventional transformations as aspects of the continuing
rule of law. We can even see various New Deal opinions of the Supreme
Court as "the functional equivalent of formal constitutional amendments,
52. 2 id. at 387.
53. See 2 id. at 60.
54. See 2 id. at 116,120.
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providing a solid foundation for activist intervention" by courts55 without
threatening unbroken adherence to constitutionalism. It has survived in
strange ways, but it has survived throughout.5 6
But these patterns, we have already seen, are highly complex. They
seem to have been unearthed only recently and to be grasped fully only by
Professor Ackerman himself. Even in his capable hands, it is hard to keep
track of them. (Just how many stages were there to Reconstruction higher
lawmaking?) It seems unlikely that many people have consciously regarded
the "unconventional" constitutional changes he describes as legitimate
because, even though they violated law read formalistically, they displayed
continuities and regularities with past modes of unconventional higher
lawmaking. Ackerman is driven instead to the rather weak claim that his
unconventional constitutional transformers can be seen as perpetuating the
rule of law because they never wholly repudiated existing legal processes.57
Instead they conformed to them when they could. It is not their strict
constitutionalism but rather their mixture of "legalistic and extralegal
elements" that is the "hallmark of unconventional adaptation."
These points do not make a terribly convincing defense of America's
continuous legalism. At bottom, they assert proudly that Americans have
never broken more laws than they thought they had to break in order to get
what they wanted. That claim could be made for many bank robbers. Why
should reformers' partial willingness to employ existing legal forms justify
a claim of fundamental legal continuity any more than their willingness to
employ extralegal or illegal forms justifies a claim of fundamental
disruption of the rule of law? Both claims appear at least equally
persuasive. Saying a process is only partly illegal is a bit like saying a
woman is only partly pregnant. Arguably, that part is definitive.
In fact, on closer inspection Ackerman concedes that the deepest source
of legitimacy for these unconventional processes of higher lawmaking is
not their conformity to law, however defined. It is that we can see in these
processes convincing evidence of informed and sustained popular
authorization of the changes in question. That is why it is important that
there be enough electoral success to be able to claim reformers have
legitimately played a signaling role; that there then be an election after
specific proposals have been made that empowers the reformers to attack
more conservative governmental actors; and that there be a confirming
election when the conservatives have capitulated. The key demand
throughout is that processes of change win popular approval. That is why,
55. 2 id. at 26.
56. See 2 id. at 14-15, 68, 70, 91-95, 232.
57. See 2 id. at 12-13.
58. 2 id. at 12, 114, 121.
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time and time again, Ackerman emphasizes that the processes he describes
are legitimate because they show "that the People really do rule in
America," that change achieves "legitimation through a deepening
institutional dialogue between political elites and ordinary citizens" in
which "legitimacy is established by mobilized acts of consent," 9 that these
higher lawmaking structures are thus "structures of popular sovereignty,"60
that they represent ways reformers electorally "earn constitutional
authority to speak in the name of We the People,"61 that the Thirteenth
Amendment can be "legitimately understood as a valid expression of We
the People of the United States,"'62 that it was similarly "the People
themselves" who made the decisions validating the Fourteenth
Amendment,63 and that institutions promoting constitutional transformation
often rest their "perceived legitimacy" not on their "established legality"
but primarily on their "appeal to the ideal of popular sovereignty."'
Ackerman's deeper structures of constitutional governance really are
defined not by what history reveals to be in some sense settled American
constitutional law, so much as by whatever seems to be a pragmatic or
functional requirement for the exercise of popular sovereignty in particular
circumstances. 65 That, after all, is how the structures of higher lawmaking
were initially devised and legitimated at the Founding.66 This criterion of
legitimacy is so crucial to Ackerman that he suggests the Thirteenth
Amendment would not have seemed legitimate without some show of
Southern consent. Casting off his anti-formalist debunking mode, he urges
us to accept even the decisions made by the Southern states under the lash
of Andrew Johnson's coercive tactics as "still very real." 67 Even more than
Lincoln in 1838, Ackerman thus ultimately bases not only the stability but
the very legitimacy of government on popular consent, popular approval,
popular sovereignty, not on the rule of law per se. He appeals to legalistic
legitimacy passionately, as Lincoln did, yet only as a means to help prompt
the popular approval that does the real legitimating work in Ackerman's
account.
To be sure, popular consent does have powerful claims to be the
ultimate source of political legitimacy. Both as a political reality and as a
matter of normative judgment, it is tremendously important, perhaps
necessary, for major changes to receive popular approval if they are to be
59. 2 id. at 85, 94.
60. 2 id. at 116.
61. 2 id. at 121.
62. 2 id. at 123.
63. 2 id. at 162.
64. 2 id. at 168.
65. See 2 id. at 124.
66. See 2 id. at 66-67, 124.
67. 2 id. at 147-48.
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viewed as valid. Still, there are very grave problems with trying to
legitimate the U.S. government via popular consent. For at least two-thirds
of American history, the majority of the adult population was legally
ineligible to vote. Even when most class and gender restrictions were
ended, creating near-universal white suffrage after 1920, many non-whites
remained effectively disfranchised until 1965.68 Ackerman stresses that,
throughout its history, the U.S. government has usually been able to claim
more regular and more extensive expressions of popular support through
elections than most contemporaneous regimes and that its electorate has
grown more and more inclusive over time.69 Still, this frailty in relying on
consent to legitimate the American regime must be borne in mind, for it is
one reason to keep other criteria for legitimacy in view.
Yet Ackerman's reliance on popular consent dramatically undercuts his
emphasis on America's legalistic legitimacy, its continuous conformity to
constitutionalism and the rule of law. Ackerman admits that major
transformations have occurred in violation of existing formal legal
processes. He exhorts us to call them legally continuous, not so much
because they conformed to established "deeper" procedures of higher
lawmaking but chiefly because, in quite various ways, the people approved
them-for that is what his patterns of higher lawmaking really amount to in
the end.
If this characterization of Ackerman's position is right, then it is hard to
see how his view provides the American political system with justifiable
claims to any distinctively "legalistic" legitimacy in comparison with any
other regime that regularly holds national elections. Indeed, even insisting
on national elections may be too much. Because Ackerman says modes of
popular ratification can and probably should vary, any political system that
has had major changes enacted and sustained while it has employed shifting
but not-too-irregular mechanisms for expression of popular support seems
able to claim as much legitimacy, indeed as much "legalist" continuity, as
the United States. From philosophical, historical, and comparative political
perspectives, Ackerman plausibly contends that the government can claim
significant continuing legitimation via relatively meaningful popular rule (if
we define "the People" as the electorate and set aside momentarily the
severe and unjust restrictions on suffrage that prevailed for so long).
Ackerman does not, however, support his more distinctive claim that the
United States merits legitimacy for its ongoing, if unconventional,
68. See SMrrH, supra note 2, at 15, 511-12 n.6.
69. See 2 ACKERMAN, supra note 11, at 13-14, 88.
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adherence to the rule of law, understood as something other than popular
rule.70
B. Surplus Meanings
It is not surprising that Ackerman's herculean effort to show that
history does support the legalistic legitimacy of the American regime
prompts him to neglect or distort some aspects of the historical record that
cannot easily be fit into his framework. Any framework is likely to do the
same in trying to bring salient order to the blooming, buzzing confusion of
human experience. Hence I will discuss only two particularly pertinent
distortions. In this Section, I address the manner in which Ackerman's
effort to vindicate the procedural legitimacy of Reconstruction within his
terms leads him to slight the understandings of American constitutional
institutions and processes that many of the relevant actors publicly
advanced at the time. In the next Section, I turn to the inadequate depictions
of the substance of Reconstruction constitutional debates that give rise to
my greatest concern.
The main procedural/institutional theme of Reconstruction actors that
Ackerman minimizes is the Whig-derived belief that, in a healthy republic
and under the United States Constitution, Congress was the true seat of
republican policymaking, while the Chief Executive was to play a
significantly subordinate role. This belief is inconvenient for Ackerman,
because he wishes to portray the leaders in his processes of higher
lawmaking as at least partly self-consciously remodeling those processes to
fit their new constitutional vision, even as they transform the Constitution
itself.71 In the case of the Fourteenth Amendment, he contends it was
appropriate for the President, followed by Congress, to propose and to
direct to a considerable degree the amending processes, because both
institutions were acting on the very same understanding animating the
substance of the amendment-the novel view that "We the People,
speaking through national institutions, may rightfully intervene" to secure
freedom and to "safeguard the exercise of equal citizenship in the states."72
Indeed, Ackerman is never more excited than when he can "glimpse the
unity integrating higher lawmaking process with substance." 73
70. This failure does not vitiate, but it does imperil, Ackerman's important subordinate
claims, featured in his first volume, that the New Deal generated legitimate constitutional
amendments and that the Court engaged in valid, conscientious efforts at synthetic constitutional
interpretation. These positions now need to be based more exclusively on appeal to popular
consent or on some other rationale. See 1 ACKERMAN, supra note 14, at 65-67, 113-62.
71. See 2 ACKERMAN, supra note 11, at 157,200.
72. 2 id. at 204.
73. 2 id.
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To be sure, this unity need not be wholly self-conscious in the minds of
the participants. It can emerge as they seek to make necessary changes and
as they define and justify the processes for doing so in terms of their new
constitutional vision. But the argument that Ackerman's framework of
higher lawmaking procedures is visibly at work is stronger if his
transforming protagonists eventually claim to be transforming
constitutional processes as well as substance in something like the ways his
approach suggests. For if they do not claim to be doing so, if they instead
describe their actions very differently, it is hard to see how the sovereign
people can be said to have deliberated upon proposed new constitutional
procedures and approved them.
Trouble is, by and large both Lincoln and the later Republicans
defended what they were doing predominantly in terms of the older
constitutional notions favored by the Whigs. Their actions can be read as
conforming to an ongoing discovery of new processes that fit their
challenges and their vision, as Ackerman suggests, but doing so loses sight
of how they actually depicted themselves. Ackerman deals with that
difficulty largely by not talking about their self-presentations. He does note
briefly that the Constitution's Framers did not envision a President who
would be "a popular tribune," and he observes that Jefferson and Jackson's
presidencies began to transform the institution in just that direction.74 He
then suggests Lincoln not only continued but dramatically accelerated that
evolution7
What Ackerman omits, however, is that the anti-Jacksonian Whigs
bitterly but consistently criticized these populist transformations of the
presidency, and that Lincoln championed the alternative Whig conception
as vocally as anyone. The Whigs, moreover, did not merely carry forward
the Founders' worries about demagoguery, though they certainly did that.
76
They argued more generally that in a large national republic, basic
governmental policies and legislation could stem only from the Congress,
the forum in which the great variety of interests within the nation could be
explicitly represented, resonantly debated, and rationally deliberated upon
in ways that checked "mobocratic" excesses, then compromised and
synthesized with a view to the greater common good. The President was not
thought properly to be a major player in this process. The job of the Chief
Executive was to execute, not make, the laws.77 Thus, as a Whig
Congressman, Lincoln strongly favored "making Presidential elections, and
the legislation of the country, distinct matters," and he successfully urged
74. 2 id. at 126-27.
75. See 2 id. at 132-36.
76. See DANIEL WALKER HOWE, THE POLITICAL CULTURE OF THE AMERICAN WHIGS 27-30
(1979).
77. See id. at 90-91.
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his party's candidate to state, "Were I president, I should desire the
legislation of the country to rest with Congress, uninfluenced by the
executive in it's [sic] origin or progress, and undisturbed by the veto unless
in very special and clear cases." 
78
As David Donald has long argued, Lincoln never admitted to changing
that view very substdntially. He continued to assert that it was "better that
congress should originate, as well as perfect its measures, without external
bias," and he generally acted accordingly.79 His presidency was a time
when Congress passed enormous amounts of monumental legislation. In
fact, James McPherson has argued that "[b]y its legislation to finance the
war, emancipate the slaves, and invest public land in future growth, the
37th Congress [1861-1862] did more than any other in history to change the
course of national life."80 Lincoln, however, was not openly involved in
most of that work, partly due to his war responsibilities, partly due to his
lack of expertise on some issues," and partly because his Whig "political
education" 12 convinced him he should show Congress "appropriate Whig
deference."8" His allegiance to this restricted executive role can be
obscured because Lincoln also believed that as Commander-in-Chief during
a time of armed conflict, he had broad war powers to do everything
necessary to gain victory, restore peace, and reestablish relations with the
rebel states reconstructed according to what he took to be the true spirit of
the Constitution, one dedicated to ending slavery. The pursuit of those great
purposes led him to take quite sweeping actions that probably crossed the
line into illegality, and he defended his prerogatives as the nation's wartime
leader quite strenuously. It also led him to advocate constitutional change,
most notably the eventual Thirteenth Amendment. But he justified those
actions, as noted earlier, as prerequisites for saving the Union (though only
on the right substantive basis).' He did not hint at any vision of the
President as a populist leader in ordinary times. Admittedly, Lincoln also
believed strongly in the Whig vision of internal improvements, and he did
work quietly for such measures as the National Banking Act and openly on
behalf of a Department of Agriculture. Yet he often expressed reluctance to
speak even when he felt impelled to take or urge positions on what he saw
78. DONALD, supra note 8, at 127.
79. Id. at 129.
80. See JAMES M. MCPHERSON, BATLE CRY OF FREEDOM: THE CIVIL WAR ERA 452
(1988). See generally id. at 442-53 (describing the central legislative initiatives of the 37th
Congress).
81. See DONALD, supra note 8, at 320,346; McPHERSON, supra note 80, at 444.
82. See id. at 331.
83. HOWE, supra note 76, at 274.
84. See DONALD, supra note 8, at 470-74,553-54,563.
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as legislative matters, and he usually indicated his willingness to defer if
Congress decided otherwise."s
In his very efforts on behalf of the constitutional transformations that
ended slavery, Lincoln's aversion to endorsing presidential leadership as a
routine process is evident. In his first inaugural address, he stated that he
would "make no recommendation of amendments," though he then did
so.86 When he proposed his "10% Plan" for reconstructing Louisiana, he
indicated his willingness to accept Congress's decision regarding whether
to seat representatives of the governments so formed, and he stressed that
he was open to other modes of reconstruction Congress might prefer.8 ' And
in his last annual message to Congress, he still spoke deferentially when he
said "I venture to recommend" the passage of the amendment abolishing
slavery, although he did stress the pertinence of the "voice of the people"
on the issue expressed in the 1864 election."
In all likelihood, then, neither Lincoln nor anyone else perceived him as
inaugurating or conducting an unconventional, presidentially-led new
model of higher lawmaking in the manner Ackerman describes, though he
can be seen retrospectively as having played that role. Lincoln knew he was
taking extraordinary actions during the war. He did play a strong leadership
role in constitutional change. He did seek to legitimate his role by appeal to
popular approval. But he presented himself as doing what was necessary
under extraordinary conditions, not as advocating or culminating any more
permanently "plebiscitarian" role of the President, any enduring
transformation of national constitution-making processes, or even any
major shift in what he understood to be the balance of power between the
nation and the states, except in regard to the momentous and far-reaching
issue of slavery. (We should, however, remember that he had long been a
nationalistic Whig, not a states'-rights Jacksonian Democrat.) Ackerman
sees Lincoln's actions as culminating in a "formal symbol" of the Civil
War and Reconstruction changes, including adoption of "a different model
of the Presidency": He stresses that Lincoln broke precedent by signing the
Thirteenth Amendment when Congress sent it to him, apparently
inadvertently. 9 Yet it seems wishful thinking to attach great significance to
85. See id. at 129, 424.
86. Abraham Lincoln, First Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1861), in 5 WRITINGS, supra note 1,
at 264.
87. Abraham Lincoln, Proclamation of Amnesty and Reconstruction (Dec. 8, 1863), in 7 id.
at 32.
88. Abraham Lincoln, Annual Message to Congress (Dec. 6, 1864), in 7 id. at 261.
89. 2 ACKERMAN, supra note 11, at 135-36. In fact, however, James Buchanan had
previously signed the "Corwin Amendment" in 1861, which would have protected slavery in the
states. It was never ratified. See EDWARD McPHERSON, THE POLICAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED
STATES OF AMiERICA DURING THE GREAT REBELLION 58-64, 108 (3d ed. 1876). My thanks to
Philip Klinkner and Akhil Amar for reminding me of this fact.
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this act. Although Lincoln signed the amendment gladly, he did not think it
made much difference whether he did so.9
But though Ackerman's narrative assigns to Lincoln a view of the
presidency somewhat at variance with Lincoln's own account, it remains
apt enough for most of Lincoln's actions. A more serious distortion occurs
when he turns to the later phase of Reconstruction led by what Ackerman
dubs the "Convention/Congress" that began challenging Andrew Johnson
in 1866.91 Ackerman uses this term to emphasize his perception that this
Republican-led Congress acted like previous constitution-making
conventions. It deliberately formulated constitutional proposals that it
sought to have legitimated, not via the "established legality" of existing
legal forms, but via appeals to "popular sovereignty." Even before
Republican successes in the election of 1866, according to Ackerman,
Republican spokesmen claimed that at this point in the nation's history,
they and only they spoke for the country; but they knew they needed
"confirmation" of this claim from other officials and ultimately from the
people at the polls.92
Again, what Ackerman leaves out here and throughout his ensuing
discussion is that most Republicans were simply asserting that, despite the
exclusion of those who had shown themselves not to be "friends" of the
Republic,93 the Congress remained the basic repository of republican
political authority in the United States. In 1864, before the
"Convention/Congress" of 1866, Wade and Davis had protested Lincoln's
pocket veto of their Reconstruction bill in exactly the same terms that
Ackerman presents as a novel assertion two years later. They contended
that Lincoln's action was a "a blow.., at the principles of republican
government" because "the authority of Congress is paramount and must be
respected.., he must confine himself to his executive duties-to obey and
execute, not make the laws." 94 That, of course, was the traditional Whig
view of the separation of powers under the Constitution and in an
uncorrupted republican system. And it was this view of their own
pennanent institutional prerogatives, rather than any special role adopted to
pursue higher lawmaking processes, that congressional Republicans most
often invoked when they went on to attack Andrew Johnson.95
The Republicans recognized that executive power had expanded under
pressure of war, but like Lincoln, they saw this as a matter of temporary
90. See DONALD, supra note 8, at 554.
91. 2 ACKERMAN, supra note 11, at 162.
92. 2 id. at 168-69.
93. 2 id. at 169.
94. DONALD, supra note 8, at 524.
95. See KErrH E. WHrITrINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION: DIVIDED PoWERs AND
CONSTITUtiONAL MEANING 116, 132-35, 427-33 (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
Whittington may disagree with my use of his evidence in some particulars.
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exigencies, and they claimed the right after war's end to restore what they
saw as the correct institutional ordering. Thaddeus Stevens and the House
managers of the impeachment process repeatedly argued that the
"sovereign power in this republic is the Congress of the United States,"
that this branch "in the government is made superior to the others," that it
was the representative of the people entitled to "controlling influence...
even to regulating the executive and the judiciary." Because the executive
was properly "subordinate to the legislative power," Johnson was supposed
to "follow and enforce the legislative will" without exercising any
"discretion unless it is conceded to him by express enactment" of
Congress. 6 In so arguing, and in impeaching Johnson because he refused to
comply, Congress was not claiming any "unconventional authority as a
tribune of the People," as Ackerman contends, but rather reasserting its
legally established and politically proper role, according to these
Republican leaders.97
Ackerman's neglect of the congressional Republicans' self-descriptions
is more serious than his mild exaggeration of Lincoln's embrace of
presidential leadership in constitutional lawmaking, in part because it
makes it hard to understand what happened next. As Ackerman briefly
notes, even when the struggle with Andrew Johnson ended, even when the
higher lawmaking efforts of the so-called "Convention/Congress" were
completed, even when the nation returned to a "regime of normal politics,"
it was one of "Congressional government."98 The Presidency would not
truly be a co-equal branch of government again, Ackerman contends, until
the 1930s.99 But nothing in his account explains this rather fundamental
constitutional ordering, which he presents as a Republican innovation. His
"Convention/Congress," after all, was supposedly claiming special,
convention-like authority to propose basic changes that would win popular
approval, after which, presumably, it would return to being just plain,
normal "Congress," no longer the preeminent "tribune of the People"
engaged in higher lawmaking.
We might amend his account to include the Congress's demand for
permanent supremacy as part of the new constitutional vision it was
proposing. Yet the congressional leaders did not present this as a change,
but rather as a restoration of what they took to be the correct constitutional
and republican arrangement, one corrupted by past Democratic Presidents
96. 1 TRIAL OF ANDREW JOHNSON, PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, BEFORE THE
SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES, ON IMPEACHMENT BY THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES FOR
HIGH CRIMES AND MISDEMEANORS 684, & 2 id. 27-28, 70, 91 (1868), quoted in WHrrrINGTON,
supra note 95, at 137-38; see 2 ACKERMAN, supra note 11, at 222-25.
97. 2 ACKERMAN, supra note 11, at 222.
98. 2 id. at 230.
99. See 2 id.
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and, due to necessity, also damaged to some degree by Lincoln. Once we
recognize that congressional leaders held that view of their proper
constitutional place, then all the actions of the extraordinary
"Convention/Congress" seem simply to be the work of the regular
Congress as they understood it. Although this revision would enable us to
understand better how and why the Republicans crafted the late nineteenth-
century era of "Congressional government," restoring what they took to be
the legitimate status quo ante, in this revised account there is not much left
of Ackerman's unconventional higher lawmaking model.
But if Ackerman's framework has difficulties capturing the endurance
of congressional power after the completion of its higher lawmaking stages,
it is also flawed in the ways it describes what led to the constitutional
conflicts during Reconstruction. Most seriously, it fails to convey what
those changes meant substantively. Ackerman does not only omit the fact
that Republicans had a rival vision of congressional/presidential powers
that defined part of their opposition to the Jacksonian Democrats,
conditioned the conduct of Lincoln, and shaped what congressional
Republicans did during and after Reconstruction. His effort to show that
history can be fitted into the confines of his unconventional but legally
legitimate higher lawmaking structures also leads him to suppress more
central dimensions of the constitutional conflicts that preceded,
characterized, and led to the end of Reconstruction. These dimensions are
the great substantive conflicts over slavery, race, and the rights of humanity
that peek through occasionally in Ackerman's account, often movingly, but
in ways that do not do full justice to their history or their moral
significance.
C. The Content of Constitutional Conflicts
Ackerman's framework includes the claim that there have been only
three major periods of higher lawmaking in U.S. history."° That contention
is useful for his effort to legitimate constitutional interpretation by the
Supreme Court. He contends that judges are "preservationists" who discern
and apply laws created by We the People, not by the judges themselves, and
thereby sustain both popular sovereignty and the rule of law. This
contention may be endangered if history displays too many transformative
"constitutional moments." For according to Ackerman's view, latter-day
courts are not only entitled but required to "synthesize" earlier "moments"
with later products of higher lawmaking; and there is inevitably significant
100. See 1 ACKERMAN, supra note 14, at41; 2 ACKERMAN, supra note 11, at 7.
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room for discretion in elaborating how older and newer broad, basic
constitutional guarantees should fit together. 1
Arguably, expanding the number of moments greatly expands that
room. Just as a musician can create a greater variety of tunes if her
instrument can play a greater number of notes, so the more moments of
constitutional higher lawmaking there are for judges to invoke, the greater
is the variety of possible constitutional philosophies they can compose,
fitting the moments together in vastly different ways. True, a judge, unlike
a composer, may feel compelled to give every constitutional "note" its due,
and this may seem restrictive. The judge still has, however, a great deal of
discretion about which tones to stress. And the more judges have such
discretion, the less they are constrained rather than empowered by law, and
the less they can be seen as essentially organs of the expressed will of We
the People. Not only the legitimacy of the bench and bar but also American
claims to govern by the rule of law and the consent of the people are again
thrown into doubt. As a patriotic defender of the legalistic legitimacy of
American institutions, Ackerman may therefore be well advised to resist
conceding that there have been more than three major constitutional
moments. One purpose of his multi-stage framework is to winnow out false
candidates for that legally potent status. He argues, for example, that
Michael McConnell's claim that the mid-1870s represent a constitutional
moment authorizing a "Jim Crow Republic" fails to meet the test."0
But though Ackerman argues skillfully in that exchange, his criteria
still seem to turn up more moments than he might like. He acknowledges
that constitutional talk is always a feature of American politics, even if not
always a highly prominent feature, so that any period is likely to see some
activity that can be interpreted as a would-be constitutional movement.0 3
Because his criteria permit almost infinite variations in signaling,
proposing, and resisting, any political movement that survives repeated
elections can probably be interpreted as having advanced constitutional
proposals that were duly resisted and ratified. If Ackerman resists
McConnell's infelicitous nomination of the Gilded Age Democrats (who
did not win many elections) as successful constitutional transformers, he
concedes that the Jacksonian Democrats do meet his procedural tests."
Therefore, to deny the Age of Jackson entry into the panoply of full-fledged
constitutional moments, he minimizes the substance of the changes the
Jacksonians enacted. Ackerman contends the Jacksonians did not seek or
achieve "the sweeping transformation I associate with the great regime
101. See infra Part I.
102. 2 ACKERMAN, supra note 11, at 471-74 n.126.
103. See 1 ACKEPMAN, supra note 14, at 269-72, 293-94.
104. See 1 id. at 76-77. A stronger argument than McConnell's is that late nineteenth-century
Republicans and Democrats both agreed to subvert the meaning of the postwar amendments.
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changes in American history." Their constitutional revisioning did not go
"deep" enough and so their acts were insufficiently "transformative." ' 05
What was the relatively minor novel substance of the Jacksonian
vision? The Founders had left important matters ambiguous, including the
balance of power between nations and states, the constitutional status of
slavery, and the issue of racial criteria for citizenship. On these issues,
many Federalists had tended in more nationalistic, more "free labor," or
even more racially inclusive directions. Even more than the Jeffersonians,
the Jacksonians stood emphatically for the converse positions. Theirs was
"a vision that insisted on the supremacy of the white man over the black
and red races" and on America as a "decentralized democracy by white
men." 106 Justice Roger Taney's opinion in Dred Scott, Ackerman correctly
contends, was the culminating effort of the Court to cement or "codify"
this vision's place in, or better as the heart of, American
constitutionalism."°7
Within Ackerman's framework, then, Taney's opinion was an effort to
complete a heretofore successful constitutional moment that was legitimate
by the criteria of higher-lawmaking structures and popular sovereignty.
Ackerman concedes that this fact provides a sobering revelation of the
moral limitations of dualistic democracy. His theory identifies the
Jacksonians' chief problem not as the moral evils of their racism but rather
as the tactical inconveniences of their view of federalism. They were states'
rights "decentralizers," and this feature of their philosophy prevented them
from using national institutions to implement their vision fully. Although
Taney's effort to use the Court for that purpose worked in strictly legalistic
terms, because Dred Scott operated as the law of the land, it did not work
for long. Dred Scott failed politically, sparking extensive popular
controversy that realigned the party system and precipitated civil war."'
The Jacksonians' chief opponents, the Whigs, tended like the Federalists, to
be more anti-slavery. But Southern Whigs disagreed, and the party
disintegrated in the 1850s as the slavery issue became more and more
central in American life. In their place rose Lincoln's Republicans. Aided
by northern opposition to Dred Scott, they were bound together by a
commitment to "arrest the further spread of slavery" by prohibiting it in the
territories, a policy Lincoln saw as one that would allow the public mind to
"rest in the belief' that slavery was "in the course of ultimate
105. 1 id. at 76-77.
106. 1 id. at 79.
107. Id. at 77-79; 2 ACKERMAN, supra note 11, at 270. For a more detailed description of the
Jacksonian era and the Taney Court in fundamentally similar terms, see SMITH, supra note 2, at
196-242.
108. See 1 ACKERMAN, supra note 14, at 77-80.
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extinction.""9 This represented one of the two "constitutional counter-
visions" elaborated in the great 1858 Lincoln-Douglas debates." There
Lincoln condemned slavery as a hateful, "monstrous injustice.""' Stephen
Douglas, however, presented a modified Jacksonian Democratic ideology
that stressed "popular sovereignty," whether or not it resulted in slavery,
while steadfastly opposing conferring citizenship "upon negroes, Indians,
and other inferior races." 2
At this point, we can begin to see the costly ways in which Ackerman's
framework for legitimating the American regime minimizes moral
substance. According to his telescoped but accurate retelling, the
Jacksonian era was a thirty-year period when the nation through popular
elections frequently endorsed, and the courts consolidated, a vision of the
United States as a state-centered, racist white "democracy" in ways that
went far beyond the settled constitutional understandings of the Founding
era. One might well regard this as a rather monumental transformation.
Ackerman is himself vividly aware of its tremendous moral significance.
Enough Americans at the time saw it as a critical change that it generated
further, undeniably major constitutional struggles.
But Ackerman's theory cannot help us grasp or defend either their
moral objections to Jacksonian outlooks or his own. For in his account,
legitimacy is a matter of maintaining the rule of law, at least at some deep
structural level, and even more of popular sovereignty wielded by the
existing electorate. The Jacksonians do well on these counts. We might be
tempted to say that their restriction of the franchise to white men denies
them legitimacy in terms of popular sovereignty. We might even say that
legitimation via popular sovereignty counsels in favor of expanding the
franchise rather than heightening racial restrictions on it.
Ackerman, however, cannot make these moves. If he did, then the
regime would not be legitimated by popular consent, his highest touchstone,
through most of history. After all, most adult residents did not vote in the
United States until 1920, and although the electorate has been made more
inclusive over time, both the late antebellum period and the late nineteenth
century saw the spread of new suffrage exclusions. Ackerman could and
probably should say instead that the Jacksonian age was a successful
"constitutional moment" that was effaced in all its major elements by the
subsequent moment of Reconstruction. That account would, however, stress
109. 3 WRrINGS, supra note 1, at 212.
110. 1 ACKERMAN, supra note 14, at 79.
111. Abraham Lincoln, Reply, First Joint Debate, at Ottawa (Aug. 21, 1858), in 3 WRrnNGs,
supra note 1, at 206.
112. Stephen Douglas, Speech, First Joint Debate, at Ottawa (Aug. 21, 1858), in 3 id. at 202,
198; see SMIT-, supra note 2, at 249-51 (contrasting the Douglas and Lincoln positions on slavery
and equality).
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the discontinuous, disruptive character of Reconstruction and of American
constitutional development more than Ackerman wishes to do.
Hence Ackerman has two reasons to treat the Jacksonian era in the
dismissive fashion he does. First, his legalistic legitimating efforts may be
undercut by the discovery of too many constitutional moments. Thus, he
minimizes the changes of the Jacksonian era-the now-unqualified embrace
of slavery and of America as the land of white supremacy-as not "deep"
or "transformative" enough to count. Second, the way his theory minimizes
substantive standards of legitimacy in favor of legalistic and consensual
criteria also leaves him with few if any resources to condemn this
Jacksonian championing of slavery and racism as illegitimate, even though
he clearly believes they are. Better, then, to move quickly past the period,
suggesting it did not really amount to much.
That suggestion is both normatively and empirically unconvincing.
Morally, the Jacksonians' successes in entrenching racist, proslavery
visions of America were, as Lincoln said, "monstrous" evils. It is
disturbing to see such changes termed insufficiently significant to count as
major transformations. Moreover, Ackerman's account also leaves us
empirically less equipped to explain how the Democrats' efforts generated
the Lincolnian counter-vision, and hence the next constitutional moment.
Many factors contributed to the Republican challenges. We cannot,
however, understand the passionate opposition to Dred Scott and slavery's
spread that fueled Lincoln's 1858 and 1860 campaigns unless we grasp why
many Americans saw the Jacksonian proslavery innovations as profoundly
illegitimate, whatever their bona fides in terms of higher-lawmaking
structures and electoral successes. But that position expresses standards of
legitimacy that are barely visible in Ackerman's theory, although they were
central to the constitutional developments he describes.
Even as Ackerman's framework prods him to exaggerate the concern of
Lincoln and later the congressional Republicans to remodel American
constitutional lawmaking processes, it steers him away from seriously
exploring the substantive constitutional visions of all the actors who
contributed to the rise and fall of Reconstruction. Ackerman pays relatively
little sustained attention to the Jacksonians' rationales for a decentralized
slaveholding republic, Stephen Douglas's defenses of a whites-only regime
of "popular sovereignty," and Lincoln's articulations of antislavery
constitutionalism and the Reconstruction Republicans' eventual call for
racially inclusive equal citizenship. That neglect is not essentially a matter
of space limitations. Examining their substantive visions is by Ackerman's
lights not necessary for the task of legitimating Reconstruction and the
American regime more broadly.
This element of his approach is particularly unfortunate for the Civil
War/Reconstruction era, because destructive mischaracterizations and
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minimizations of the Lincoln Republicans' moral commitments remain all
too common today. Even the most celebrated recent biography of Lincoln
does more to perpetuate than to correct these interpretive tendencies.
Though he sees Lincoln as driven by "unquenchable ambition" 113 and as
working "indefatigably," 114 David Donald initially stresses what he terms
"the essential passivity" 115 of Lincoln's nature, his "reluctance to take the
initiative and make bold plans," 116 and his "pragmatic" 117 rather than
ideological approach to the problems he did work strenuously to solve.
From this, it is easy to form a picture of Lincoln as a man without a larger
vision or motivating principles. Many features of Donald's subsequent
account reinforce that view. Rather than seeing Lincoln as consistently
supporting reform, Donald dismisses the young Lincoln's advocacy of
suffrage for qualified women as a "joke.""' He suggests that Lincoln
opposed the Mexican-American War purely for tactical, partisan reasons
and that, for a long time, Lincoln was not too much alarmed by the
extension of slavery, though he opposed it."9 He stresses that Lincoln was
"circumspect" in his public "position on nativism."' 20 He also suggests
that Lincoln and Douglas's 1858 disputes over the Declaration of
Independence had "little practical relevance" 2' to the issues of the day, and
that, above all, "Lincoln's commitment to maintaining the Union was
absolute,"' 22 rather than Lincoln's commitment to fulfilling the
Declaration's principles as he understood them. Donald then interprets the
powerful evidence to the contrary-Lincoln's repeated and intense refusals
to contemplate saving the Union by permitting slavery to spread-as arising
from concerns to avoid disruption of the Republican Party and from being
just plain "stubborn." "z
All these points reinforce longstanding themes in American
historiography and popular discourse influenced by Southern apologists:
that Lincoln and his party really stood for no substantial moral principles;
that bungled statesmanship, the wrangling of power-hungry politicians,
northern economic interests, or Northerners' desires to dominate the South
actually caused the Civil War. Similarly, by advancing a framework that
minimizes attention to the substantive constitutional views of Taney,
113. DONALD, supra note 8, at 14.
114. Id. at 15.
115. Id. at 14.
116. Id. at 15.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 59.
119. See id. at 122-24, 134-35.
120. Id. at 170.
121. Id. at226.
122. Id. at 269.
123. Id. at 270.
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Lincoln, Douglas, Andrew Johnson, the Congressional Republicans, and the
post-war Supreme Court on these issues, Ackerman offers a "constitutional
narrative" that leaves largely unchallenged the many claims that moral
principle had little to do with the events of these years. To be sure, neither
Donald nor Ackerman is at heart a Southern apologist. Both do greater
justice to Lincoln and the other protagonists than this summary suggests.
Even so, I fear, they still convey this minimizing message.
It is also the wrong message, particularly with regard to Lincoln. True,
he usually distanced himself from radical positions until the movement of
popular opinion offered some hope that they could be constructively
pursued. But when it came to human rights and liberties, he frequently took
bold stances that threatened to end his political viability and that indeed
produced many defeats. Whatever one makes of his 1836 endorsement of a
qualified female franchise (a position he took in a published letter that in
other ways supported a broader franchise than most Whigs would
accept 24), he was utterly serious in 1857 when he endorsed gender as well
as racial equality that went far beyond the laws of his day. He contended
then that in terms of the rights of free labor, it is the "natural right" of a
"black woman" to "eat the bread she earns with her own hands, without
asking leave of any one else, she is my equal and the equal of all
others" -a striking passage Donald does not cite. Donald also does not
mention that Lincoln sought to inspire audiences with the vision of a nation,
indeed a world, free of slavery as early as 1842,26 nor does he give weight
to how Lincoln later worked openly to prevent Republicans from endorsing
nativist policies. Hence, his minimizations of the impassioned moral terms
in which Lincoln denounced the Mexican-American War are less than
convincing.
Moreover, while it is true that in 1854 Lincoln was willing to
contemplate extending slavery "rather than see the Union dissolved, just as
I would consent to any great evil to avoid a greater one," " he was already
arguing that no such strategy would work. By 1856, he had come to the
view that preserving the Union meant preserving it "in the purity of its
principles as well as in the integrity of its territorial parts." 28 That meant
insisting that the principles of the Declaration of Independence be pursued
by placing slavery on the path to extinction, rather than permitting its
expansion and nationalization-the very relevant practical issues facing the
124. See Lincoln, To the Editor (June 13, 1836), in 1 WRMINGS, supra note 1, at 131.
125. Abraham Lincoln, Speech in Springfield, Illinois (June 26, 1857), in 2 WRrINGS, supra
note 1, at 299.
126. Abraham Lincoln, Address Before the Springfield Washingtonian Temperance Society
(Feb. 22, 1842), in 1 WRrINGS, supra note 1, at 274.
127. Abraham Lincoln, Speech at Peoria (Oct. 16, 1854), in 2 WRITINGS, supra note 1, at
215-16.
128. DONALD, supra note 8, at 192.
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Congress that would be elected in 1858. From 1856 on, Lincoln never
wavered. He said in February 1861 that he "would rather be
assassinated" 129 than to save the union on any other basis. Soon thereafter,
he accepted civil war rather than compromise over extending slavery, and
he eventually led in its abolition once the circumstances of the Civil War
gave the national government the power, and, as he saw it, the legal as well
as the preexisting moral right to do so. He also began advocating for a
limited franchise for blacks by 1864.130 His endorsement of that position in
his last speech finally spurred John Wilkes Booth to enact the assassination
Lincoln had imagined.'
Though he did not ponder religion, morality, and justice as Lincoln did,
Stephen Douglas probably believed with equal sincerity that adhering to his
policy of popular sovereignty for white men only would enable the United
States to "go forward increasing in territory, in power, in strength, and in
glory until the Republic of America shall be the North Star that shall guide
the friends of freedom throughout the civilized world." 132 The clash
between Douglas and Lincoln was indeed "a choice between two
fundamentally opposed views of the meaning of the American
experience." 133 Ackerman recognizes that fact. That is why he treats the
election of 1860 as a signaling election, even though it did not produce a
mandate for any particular constitutional course, because the vote of the
proslavery majority of the electorate was divided among three candidates."
But, according to his theory, if the Democrats had united around a
successful Stephen Douglas or some other proslavery candidate, the choice
of that constitutional vision would have been impeccably legitimate. 135 This
is not a satisfactory understanding of constitutional legitimacy. The more
one reflects on the starkly opposed substantive visions then at stake, one
championing basic rights for all humanity, the other, a republic of perpetual
racism, the more unacceptable this slighting of their intrinsic moral merits
becomes.
The costs of this morally narrow understanding of legitimacy only
increase as Ackerman proceeds. In a compelling passage, Ackerman claims
that he cannot read the "brilliant speeches" of the Congressional Radical
Republicans envisioning a massive political, social, and economic
transformation of the South to make genuine racial equality possible
129. Abraham Lincoln, Address in the Hall of Independence, Philadelphia (Feb. 22, 1861), in
5 WRrITNGS, supra note 1, at 245-46.
130. See DONALD, supra note 8, at 202,231,268-70, 342-43, 368, 398,487, 563.
131. Seeid. at588.
132. Stephen Douglas, Speech, First Joint Debate, Ottawa, Illinois (Aug. 21, 1858), in 3
WRITINGS, supra note 1, at 203.
133. DONALD, supra note 8, at 227.
134. See 2 ACKEnLAN, supra note 11, at 127.
135. See 2 id. at 126-27, 132.
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"without physically experiencing a bitter sense of the moral opportunity
lost by America when Andrew Johnson" obstructed their Reconstruction
efforts. 136 Yet, Ackerman says he rejects "condemning" this "conservative
use of Presidential power in the evolving higher lawmaking system." " The
majority of Americans, he thinks, were not ready to support the Radicals
then, so that they could have succeeded only by transforming themselves
into "dictators." 138 He goes on to commend the "great merit" of Johnson's
"Presidential leadership in 1865" '9 for its role in clarifying Reconstruction
alternatives for the people. Johnson, Ackerman says laudingly, "vastly
increased the legitimacy of the decision by the People to embrace
revolutionary reform." '40 Were it not for him and his ferocious defense of
America as a white man's country, then "we might never have known that
nineteenth-century Americans were prepared to set aside their racist
prejudices long enough to support the Republican vision of a Union that
made birth-right citizenship, and not skin color, the fundamental bond that
sustains our identity as a People." 141
This sentiment reflects a triumph of legalistic attachment to
legitimating processes over legitimate substance. In truth, from 1865
through 1867, Andrew Johnson wreaked havoc on the efforts of more
liberal Freedman's Bureau officials to secure physical protection, fair legal
treatment, political rights, education, and economic resources for Southern
blacks. He vetoed laws that would have gone far toward making those
efforts successful by making land available to blacks and increasing the
Bureau's resources and life span. In so doing, Johnson greatly encouraged
Southern whites to resist the attempted transformations of their entrenched
systems of white supremacy far more vigorously, violently, and ultimately
successfully than they had the will to do at the war's end. The laws Johnson
vetoed were passed by a Congress dominated by moderate, not radical,
Republicans who could claim extensive popular support.142 Ackerman is
right that few Americans were prepared to endorse the full radical agenda
of Thaddeus Stevens in the mid-1860s. 43 Yet, if even a moderate
Republican had succeeded Lincoln in the White House, it seems very likely
that Reconstruction would have been far more successful in enabling freed
136. Id. at 158.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 159.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 164.
141. Id. at 182.
142. For accounts detailing the harms of Johnson's policies, see W.E.B. DU BOiS, BLACK
RECONSTRUCTION IN AMERICA, 1860-1880 (Atheneum 1973) (1935); ERIC FoNER,
RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA'S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION, 1863-1877 (1988); and SMITH, supra
note 2, at 286-312.
143. See 2 ACKERMAN, supra note 11, at 158.
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blacks to support themselves economically and to participate in inclusive
and effective public schools, courts, legislatures, and other public offices
where they lived. The fact that the nation missed that opportunity should
morally sicken us. It is wrong to treat Johnson's actions as somehow
justified nonetheless. When Ackerman responds with relatively unqualified
applause to Johnson's massively racist and hugely destructive war against
congressional attempts to secure equal rights for African Americans, he
confirms that focusing too much on procedural legitimation leads one to
miss the moral forest for some all too shady legal trees.
The problems of Ackerman's approach do not end there. Once the
congressional Republicans' constitutional transformation produced the
Fourteenth Amendment, their changes had to be, under Ackerman's theory,
consolidated or legally codified by the Supreme Court. The "last great step
in their consolidation," Ackerman tells us, was the Supreme Court opinion
of Justice Samuel Miller in the famed Slaughter-House Cases of 1873.144
From the standpoint of his theory and its focus on "not substance but
process," what Ackerman finds most significant about the case is that
Miller and the rest of the Court all "unconditionally accept" the "validity"
of both the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments, though they disagree
about their "meaning." "' Justice Miller presents the amendments as having
been added "by the voice of the people," '46 without regard to whether the
people's actions conformed to the formal amending processes of Article V.
For Ackerman, this represents a court acting "consistently with common
law norms" by treating as legally valid actions that have become widely
accepted, even if they do not appear to conform to requirements of older
legal texts.' 47
In his first volume, Foundations, Ackerman did briefly concern himself
with the substance of the Slaughter-House decision, but only as part of his
effort to vindicate the Court's record of engaging in credible, good-faith
constitutional interpretation consistent with maintaining the rule of law.'48
Ackerman claimed there that the Court's decision represented an effort to
synthesize the recent Reconstruction amendments with the original
Constitution via a "particularizing" 49 strategy that read the innovations
relatively narrowly, as concerned chiefly with "the freedom of the slave
race." '50 Hence, the white butchers invoking the amendments lost their
case. Over time, Ackerman indicated, the Court understandably became
144. 2 id. at 245; see Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873).
145. 2 ACKERMAN, supra note 11, at 245.
146. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. at 67.
147. 2 ACKERMAN, supra note 11, at 246.
148. See 1 ACKEMIAN, supra note 14, at 94-98.
149. 1 id. at 95.
150. 1 id. (quoting Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. at 71).
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more willing to recognize the breadth of the changes the amendments had
wrought, so later synthesizing decisions gave them more weight. Still, we
are left to feel that the Slaughter-House Court did what was appropriate,
certainly what was legitimate, for its time.
If we attend to the substantive constitutional conflicts of the
Reconstruction era, however, the Slaughter-House ruling looks very
different. Far from the last step in the consolidation of the post-war
amendments, its denial of claims for economic liberties based on the
amendments appears to be the first step in what soon became a concerted
judicial and political effort to undercut them, especially when invoked by
African Americans. In Slaughter-House, Justice Miller chose to read the
Fourteenth Amendment, especially the Privileges and Immunities Clause,
extraordinarily narrowly, out of a professed fear that to do otherwise would
"fetter and degrade the state governments." 15' Yet, in other contexts, Miller
was often willing to find broad-ranging rights of national citizenship
implicit in the Constitution no matter how much they intruded on state
laws. In no other case, moreover, would Miller ever insist again, or indeed
even accept, that the amendment was chiefly confined to assisting "the
slave race." ' 52 His pattern henceforth was to instead support restrictive
readings chiefly when black litigants were involved.
At the time the Court decided Slaughter-House, it was flooded with
litigation involving claims of African Americans under the amendments,
while the defenders of Reconstruction faced mounting, often overfly racist
political opposition. Though the Court did not possess certiorari jurisdiction
at this time, it did exercise discretion about the timing of its decisions. For
example, it withheld handing down its ruling in Bradwell v. Illinois,'5
which was fully argued before Slaughter-House, until after it had rendered
the latter decision. It could similarly have held Slaughter-House back until
it construed the Fourteenth Amendment in a case involving blacks. Instead,
Miller and his majority selected a politic venue, a case involving whites, not
one of the many involving blacks, as their first Fourteenth Amendment case
to launch a judicial retreat from using the Reconstruction amendments to
protect blacks. That retreat would, by and large, only increase for the
remainder of the century. 54
Although this interpretation of Slaughter-House is controversial,
Ackerman does not even consider whether Slaughter-House actually
represented a judicial attack on the substance of the post-war amendments.
151. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. at 78.
152. Id. at 70.
153. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130 (1873). Although Bradwell was argued on January 18, 1872, the
decision was not announced until April 15, 1873. See SHELDON GOLDMAN, CONSTITUTIONAL
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His concern is not with the decision's substance, but with its support for the
amendments' legal validity and with its credibility as an example of
procedurally legitimate judicial decisionmaking. A framework that so
dismisses substance that it does not even ask the question of whether a
decision it deems a "consolidation" may in reality be an amendment's
demolition is not an adequate guide for assessing the legitimacy of such
governing decisions. Ackerman agrees that, after the end of Reconstruction,
"American institutions increasingly failed to preserve the commitments
previously made by the People to black Americans." 155 But he doubts that
this occurred because the Supreme Court betrayed "its task of preserving
constitutional commitments." 15 6 Instead, he hints that there was "something
inherently defective in the approach to racial justice taken by the
amendments-defects which doomed them to failure even if judges had
done their best to redeem the People's commitments," and promises to
elaborate that suggestion in his next volume.157 It is already clear, however,
that he wants to uphold above all else the legitimacy of the Court and of
American higher lawmaking processes, rather than substantive
constitutional positions that he believes those processes can be counted on
to perfect.
V. CONCLUSION: THE LIMITS OF LEGALISTIC LEGITIMACY
In its quest to demonstrate the legitimacy of Reconstruction and the
American regime by appealing to essentially procedural standards of the
rule of law and popular approval, Ackerman's theory suffers from serious
deficiencies. It produces some historical distortions of the self-
understanding of political actors and leads him to minimize the substantive
moral aims of the Lincoln Republicans. More seriously, Ackerman's
posture renders him far too approving of those who opposed and,
ultimately, sharply limited the scope of Reconstruction reforms, including
both Andrew Johnson and the Supreme Court of the 1870s. Yet I do not
dispute that basing the legitimacy of governmental institutions and policies
on substantive moral grounds instead of conformity to the rule of law and
the will of the people raises the dangers of enduring divisions as well as
vanguardist despotism that rightly concern Ackerman. After all, who is
entitled to decide what substantive moral principles are truly authoritative?
Is it safe to assign that task to anyone other than the sovereign demos? The
temptation to talk about legitimacy in terms of legal processes and popular
sovereignty, without attention to substance, is eminently understandable.
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Ackerman's works show, however, that in the end we simply cannot
really do so. In his first volume, Ackerman admits that the fact that his
theory can legitimate Dred Scott is an example of its "moral limitations." '58
In a similar vein, he states in his recent work that "no sane American
supposes that the country would be better off without the Fourteenth
Amendment."159 Ackerman also repeatedly rejoices in the fact that
Reconstruction proves that "Americans can transcend their racist instincts
in response to the ideal of equal citizenship." " What is the source of
Ackerman's regret about the legalistically legitimate Dred Scott ruling and
his joy about the anti-racist, but only controversially legally and popularly
legitimate Fourteenth Amendment? Why does "no sane American" dispute
his approval of the Amendment? It cannot be because of the procedural
legitimacy or illegitimacy of the higher lawmaking structures involved. It
surely is because most Americans today-including Ackerman-believe
that Dred Scott was in substance morally reprehensible, that the Fourteenth
Amendment is substantively admirable, and that consequently it is very
good that the nation repudiated Dred Scott and adopted the Fourteenth
Amendment, however it did so. Ackerman's comments make no sense if
our key standards for legitimacy are simply conformity to the rule of law
and popular approval. They appeal instead to our belief that the substance
of what is done is crucial for the question of ultimate legitimation.
Even if it is correct that legalistic standards of legitimacy and popular
sovereignty cannot entirely substitute for substantive judgments about what
is morally good and right, that fact alone tells us little if anything about
what substantive moral standards we should adopt. It simply means that
every adequate analysis of legitimacy must give a highly prominent place to
substantive moral values, thereby going well beyond what Ackerman
attempts. Those values must be defended via arguments that consider not
only the character of law but many other pertinent features of human
experience, including accounts of basic human needs and various forms of
human flourishing, as well as the lessons that history, science, philosophy
and art all provide as to how they may best be realized. As I have
previously contended in defense of my own substantive commitments, such
arguments probably cannot ever show that particular moral positions are
compelled by reason alone. 16' Hence, ongoing disagreements over
158. 1 ACKERMAN, supra note 14, at 79.
159. 2 ACKERMAN, supra note 11, at 163.
160. 1 ACKERMAN, supra note 14, at 79; ACKERMAN, supra note 11, at 164 n.*. The phrase
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learned was produced by late nineteenth-century racialist scientific theories, theories invoked via a
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substantive morality seem inevitable. Again, this is why it is alluring to try
to evade the necessity of deciding on such matters in public life. But if we
cannot evade that necessity, I believe we are well advised instead to explore
controversial substantive issues as thoroughly and honestly as possible.
We must even be open to the possibility that Ackerman, like most law-
centered analysts, implicitly rules out from the start: Governmental action
taken in genuine violation of the rule of law or even the will of the people
may still be legitimate in some circumstances. 62 Hence, the Reconstruction
amendments may have been ineradicably extralegal and coerced, yet still
legitimate-a description that, given American suffrage limitations, may
well be closer to the truth than Ackerman's account. We would also have
the resources to judge whether governmental institutions and policies have
been or are today fundamentally illegitimate for substantive moral reasons,
whether or not they have legalistic and consensual legitimacy. Those are,
admittedly, dangerous inquiries, as Ackerman protests.163 But if we take as
our clients both historical and moral truth, not simply the country that has
served us and many-but not all-others extremely well, then these are
inquiries we cannot rightly forgo. To engage in them, we must think about
the legitimacy of Reconstruction, of the U.S. political system, and of
government more broadly in ways that go beyond the essentially procedural
standards on which Ackerman's elaborate and impressive structure of
normative and historical analysis rests. As Lincoln suggested, we need to
assess governing arrangements in terms of their substantive contributions to
the noblest causes that human institutions can and therefore should be made
to serve.
162. See Smith, supra note 28, at 221-23, 242-49.
163. See 2 ACKERMAN, supra note 11, at 175-76.
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